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IN 'IHE SUPREME OOURT
OF 'IHE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs.-

)
)

Gase No.

14624

ALBERT ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF 'IBE KIND OF CASE
'Ihe appellant, Albert Ross, was convicted before the
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of
Utah, of the crime of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for
Value in violation of Utah Code Ann.,
Honorable Ronald

o.

58-37-8 ( 1953) •

Hyde, Judge, presided.

'Ihe

From that judgment of convic-

tion the defendant brings this direct appeal.

DISroSITION IN 'IHE LOWER COURT
'Ihe jury impaneled in the matter found the defendant
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guilty of the crime of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for
Value.

Subsequently, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve

an indeterminate sentence in the Utah State Prison of from one to
fifteen years, as provided by law.

STATEMENT OF FAC'IS
On December 9, 1975, at approximately 3:15 p.m., one
Kenneth Goode, an undercover narcotics operative for the Ogden
City Police, entered a residence located at 823 West Ellis Street,
Ogden, Utah, for the purpose of making an alleged

"controlled

buy" of narcotics with money furnished him by the Ogden City
Police.

('Ir. 5-6, 12, 31).
At trial in this matter, the only testimonial evidence

a,4duced by the State of Utah with respect to what transpired within said
residence was furnished by Mr· Goode. Briefly, Mr· Goode's uncorroborated testimony was that, upon entering said residence, he encountered appellant and one Fred Ea.ton.

After some brief preliminary

conversation with defendant regarding the proposed buy, Mr· Goode
testified that he gave Mr· Eaton $200.00 and received eight "ballons"
of a substance identified at trial as Heroin ('Ir• 6}-65)•

No one

other than Mr· Goode observed the alleged transaction nor even saw
the defendant.

('Ir· 25, 40).

None of the money employed to make the
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alleged' b:•/ was ever recovered from defendant and defendant was not arrested

nor charged in the matter until some two weeks later on

December 23, 1975•
From the testimony of the undercover operative, Mr. Goode,
it was clearly

established that the State's chief witness,

was a twice convicted felon ('Ir. 5,8-9,i2,57, R· 76);a "former"
heroin addict who was, at the time of the alleged buy, under the
influence of Methadone,a Class "A" narcotic (Tr· 5, 8-9, 10,21,
31, 4-0, 56, R· 76); a thief with two pending felony charges of
Possession with Intent to Distribute for Value and Burglary arising
out of an enormous recent burglary of a local drug store in Washington
Terrace, Utah ('Ir·

21-22, 27, 32, 89); a "former" dealer in

controlled substances ('Ir. 32) who had sold drugs in substantial
quantity on numerous occasions

and was widely regarded as "one

of the biggest suppliers in Ogden"

(Tr.

105)~ who had apparently re-

ceived or was to receive some substantial consideration in exchange
for his testimony in this and related cases in the Ogden area

('lr•

8-9, 12, 10-12, 21-23, 32-33, 82, 92, 118-122), and who, at one
juncture during questioning at trial, found it necessary to invoke
his privilege against self-incrimination ('Ir• 71)•
Upon trial, in the matter, subsequent to both parties having
rested their respective cases, the jury retired to consider the matter.
Upon deliberatior., the jury returned a verdict against defendantappellant of Guilty of Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance,
and judgment and sentence

(Tr, 162-166, R. 86).

1>-·:,i_

duly entered by the trial court accordingly

From that verdict and judgment the defendant-
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appellant brings this appeal.

ARGUMENT
FOINT I
'IHE EVIllENCE PRESENTED AT 'll!IAL IN 'IHIS MA TIER WAS
UI;ALLY INSUFFICIENT 10 SUFFORT DEFENDANT'S CXlNVICTION

It is well established as a matter of law that, in a criminal
prosecution> the State must establish beyond all reasonable doubt all
of the elements of the offense charged, and that in the absence of such
degree of proof the defendant is entitled to acquittal.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Etl. 1021, 31
State V• Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119,

~9

s.

Ct. 2

Holt v.
);

p. 2d 269 (1972); State V•

Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 p. 2d 711 (1955); State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah
2d 110, 307 p. 2d 212 (1957);
p. 2d 146 (1960).

State

V•

Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350

It is further well established that the Supreme

Court, in reviewing the legal sufficientcy of the evidence submitted
to the trier of fact, may set aside a verdict of guilty where the

evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that reasonable men
could and should have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime charged.

(State v. Allgood, supra; State v.

Shonka, supra; State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Danks, supra.)
In State v. Sullivan, supra, Mr· Justice Crockett, speaking
for the Court, enunciated fully the above standard 1
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The presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof of guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt, are indeed of the utmost
importance as safeguards against the possibility of convicting the innocent. We
scrupulously adhere to them notwithstanding
the difficulties encountered and the possibility that some guilty may escape punishment. It is an ancient and honored
adage of our law that it is better that ten
guilty go free than that one innocent person be punished· We appreciate the wisdom
of that maxim
and the importance of
according every proper consideration to
those accused of crime • • •
Before a verdict may properly be set
aside, it must appear that the evidence was
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must
have entertained reasonable doubt that defendants committed the crime. Unless the
evidence compels such conclusion as a
matter of law, the verdict must s.tand.
(6 Utah 2d PP• 113-114).
Simila:dy, in State v. Danks, supra, Mr· Justice Callister
wrote:
Before setting aside a jury verdict it
must appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable
minds acting fairly upon it must have entertained reasonable doubt that defendant committed
the crime. (10 Utah at 164).
This court has also stated:
If the State ~s evidence is so inherently
improbable as to be unworthy of belief, so that
upon objective analysis i t appears that reasonable minds could not believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty, the jury's
verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if the State's
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evidence is such that reasonable minds could
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty, the verdict must be
sustained. State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306,
249 P. 2d 211 (1952). (See also State v.
Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 p. 2d 109 (1961)
for the same rule).
Finally, in what appear

to be some what variant

statements of essentially the same principle enunciated in the above
cited cases, this Court has said that a jury verdict of guilty
may be set aside when "taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict," the ''findings are unreasonable."
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 p. 2d 183 (1960).
the verdict is "supported by sufficient
trial is to be denied.
689 (1960).

State v.

Alternatively, if

competentevidence" a new

State V• Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 p. 2d

See also State

V•

Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 p. 2d 246

(1970) for the rule that there must be a ''reasonable basis" for the
verdict.
It is apparent from these various statements of the law
that this court dcY. clearly have the power to reverse and remand in
an appropriate case and to direct that a new trial be had•
This court has said that:
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that
it is the province of the jury to weigh the testimony and determine the facts. Nevertheless, we
cannot escape the responsibility of judgment upon
whether under the evidence, a jury could, in reason,
conclude that the defendant's guilt was proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 111
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Utah 379, 180 P. 2d 551, 555 (1947)•
Applying the above cited cases and authority to
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the evidence presented herein was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that the txier
of fact must and should have entertained reasonable doubt with respect to defendant's guilt.
As

previously noted in Appellant's Statement of Facts,

supra, the State's case against defendant is predicated solely upon
the testimony of one Ken Goode, an undercover operative for the Ogden
City Police.

Only Ken Goode witnessed the alleged txansaction that was

the basis of the State's case and only Ken Goode identified the
defendant as one of the individuals purportedly involved in such
transaction.

(Tr. 25, 40).

'lhe State's case is founded entirely

upon his testimony and his testimony alone.
As

regards Ken Goode, the record in this matter clearly

discloses that he is a twice convicted felon (Tr. 5, 8-9, 12, 57,
R. 76), that at the time of his testimony herein there were pending
against him two felony charges of Possession With Intent to :Jistxibute for Value and Burglary (Tr. 21-22, 27, 32, 89), that he was a
"former" dealer in contxolled substances who was widely regarded as
one of the biggest suppliers in the Ogden area, that he had appearently received or was about to receive some substantial consideration
in exchange for his testimony in this and related cases (Tr. 8-9,
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12, 10-12, 21-23, )2-.)), 82, 92, 118-122).
Appellant does not contend, nor would appellant be so naive
as to contend, that Ken Goode was not a competent witness to testify
in the trial proceedings.

(See in this regard Utah Code Annotated

78-24-1 (195'.3) and the cases and authority cited to thereafter).
Appellant only contends that when this court has had an opportunity to
review the uncorroborated and unsubsta.tiated testimony of such witness,
with attention to all of the above mentioned matters of record with
respect to such witnessej· character,

ba.c~und

..--,

and apparent and obvious

motives to fabricate, that this court will conclude that said

witnesse~-;

testimony was thoroughly impeached and unworthy of belief and that the
trier of fact, upon the "reasonable man" standard set forth _in the abovecited cases, must and should have entertained reasonable doubt that
defendant committed the c:rime charged.

CONCLIBION

'!he verdict of gu11 ty in the instant case was clearly
not supported by the believable evidence.

'!his court should reverse

the verdict and judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for
a new trial.
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CERTIFI.CATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellant
was duly served on counsel for the respondent, Robert B· Hanson,

Utah State Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah, by hand delivering three (3) copies thereof this

.lJ~ day of May, 1977•
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